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(B)ordering South of Lebanon: Hizbullah’s 
identity building strategy* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the importance of the Lebanese southern borderland area in 
the political strategy of Hizbullah’s identity building. It highlights how Hizbullah 
succeeded in its quest to become a major political player in Lebanon by using 
South Lebanon. The main hypothesis is that this borderland area has been 
ordered and bordered by Hizbullah to create a common identity among the 
Lebanese Shi’i population based on a Shi’i religious involvement and the 
“duty”of armed resistance against Israel.  To support this idea, I will rely on a 
theoretical framework articulating space and identity building and will refer to 
concepts provided by Middle Eastern studies. In the first part of the paper, I will 
discuss the conditions of the emergence of the group of solidarity and how it 
articulates to the religious Shi’i ideology. Then, I will highlight the 
“lebanonization” process Hizbullah undertaken at the end of the civil war and 
how during the 1990s it transformed the South into a sanctuary. Finally, I will 
show how Hizbullah enforced the national legitimacy of its social, political and 
military actions before targeting the state apparatus. 
 
Introduction 
Hizbullah (hizb Allah literally meaning “The Party of God”) appeared in 1982 
under the Iranian umbrella and developed in the South of Lebanon during the 
Lebanese civil war. The Party of God became a powerful political movement 
during the 1990s under Syrian tutelage with a political stronghold in Beirut and a 
military stronghold in the southern borderland along the Israeli occupied zone. In 
order to understand how this Islamic movement succeeded in building a powerful 
political force in the Lebanese political game, this paper intends to examine the 
importance that the southern borderland area has taken in the political strategy of 
Hizbullah’s identity building.  
 
The articulation of identity and space is inspired by Fredrik Barth (1969) who 
states their interdependency: identity building is a process that defines group’s 
boundaries and borders while both are having effects on the group. Moreover, 
boundaries are locating differences through establishing identity and mediating 
movements (Kirby 1996). Identity is understood here as an evolving process and 
not as a permanent state, constantly redefining its boundaries in a continual 
building process (Brubaker 2001). Space is seen as a social product, a human 
construction (Lefebvre 1991) more than a geographical factor, and tends to 
conceptualize notions of border and territory. The use of border vs boundaries 
will also follow Didier Fassin’s distinction (2010): when the former tends to 
describe a physical limit, the latter refers to the symbolic aspect of these limits, as 
among categories or groups. The notion of borderland itself will follow Randy 
Widdis’ definition (2005:154) as “a physical, ideological, and geographical 
construct, a region of intersection that is sensitive to internal and external forces 
that both integrate and differentiate communities and eras on both sides of the 
boundary line”. In sum, borders/borderlands and boundaries appear as social 
processes defining and shaping reality and key elements in the identification 
process. Moreover, as stated by David Newman (2001), territories can provide a 
perspective on how a group creates its order and belonging. Regarding Hizbullah, 
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although it is the subject of many scholarly investigations, none of the existing 
approaches refer specifically to its use of the borderland of South Lebanon for its 
political identity building. I will try, then, to highlight how Hizbullah has ordered 
and bordered the Lebanese southern borderland to create a commonality among 
Shi’i people since its appearance using a religious argumentation as well as the 
duty of resistance toward Israel and the role this area has played in shaping its 
own identity.  
 
The data collected for this research stems from several years of fieldwork –  
between 2009 and 2013. It comprises observations, interviews with members of 
Hizbullah as well as with experienced researchers and a collection of documents 
issued by the party. I will examine external as well as internal factors following 
the contextual tradition in border studies that stresses the need to discuss local 
case studies with larger scales (national, international) to understand borderland 
processes (Sahlins 1989; Paasi 1996). For the theoretical framework, I will rely 
on three concepts – “bordering”, “ordering” and “othering” – describing three 
processes working together (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002, Van Houtum, 
2010b). Bordering refers to a legitimisation of the location and demarcation, 
ordering is a way to impose a code, the production of belonging and othering 
“implies the production of categorical difference between ours and theirs” (Van 
Houtum 2010a, 960). These theoretical tools will be completed with two Arabic 
concepts, al-‘asabiyat (a group feeling/ group of solidarity)i and al-da’wa (the 
religious/political call)ii, that provide a comprehensive picture in articulating the 
group formation and its legitimization. Scholars in Middle Eastern studies 
conceive them as one of the comprehensibility schemes in the analysis of politics 
in contemporary Middle East (Bozarslan 2011).  
 
This paper follows the stages of development of Hizbullah’s identity building 
through a focus on its interaction with the southern borderland, principally 
constituted by the region of Jabal Amel. In the first section, I will discuss the 
implantation of the political/military group in the southern borderland of the 
country as it articulates the three dimensions of place/identity/enemy highlighted 
by the processes of bordering/ordering/othering. In particular, I will document the 
formation of a group of solidarity (‘asabiyat) and how it relates to the religious 
call (da’wa) in contemporary Shi’ism and the armed resistance towards the 
enemy occupying the South of Lebanon. The second part deals with the 
“lebanonization” process of the party and how Hizbullah changed its perception 
of borders and became a guardian of Lebanon’s national sovereignty. I will also 
examine how martyrdom contributed to cementing the Hizbullah’s ‘asabiyat in 
the southern borderland, transforming it into a sanctuary after the Israeli 
withdrawal of 2000. I will finally show how Hizbullah had to adapt to the post-
2006 era in withdrawing from the southern borderland as a battlefield and made 
its definition of the core notion of “resistance” as an identity means evolve to 
target the state power in depth. 
 
1) 1982-90: South of Lebanon as vantage ground for building 
the Hizbullah ‘asabiyat 
 
South of Lebanon historically saw the development of a local identity gathering 
the residents of Jabal Amel, the central zone of the southern borderland, partly 
because of their long standing religious and intellectual links with Iran (Mervin, 
2000) and partly due to the isolated process of development this region 
experienced since the onset of the Lebanese republic in 1943. At the beginning of 
the civil war in the 1970s, this region was a stronghold of the Leftist and pan-
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Arab movements, and its inhabitants shared a “borderland identity”, as defined by 
Prokkola (2009): an available social and cultural discourse that linked a location 
near a borderline to wider social and cultural processes and institutions. 
Moreover, the Shi’i population in Lebanon later experienced a sectarian 
politicization through Musa al-Sadr’s “Movement of the Deprived” that became 
the Shi’i militia, Amal (Picard, 1985). 
 
In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Hizbullah 
appeared as the result of a mobilization of several groups of Islamic Shi’i 
militants (clerics, al-Da’wa Party members and dissidents members of Amal) that 
wanted to go to war against the Israeli occupier (Mervin, 2008). The 
circumstances of its appearance are linked to the Iranian revolution (1979) that 
provided a religious framework for the setting up of a revolutionary movement 
under the banner of Shi’i Islam. It is also related to a will to resist the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF), perceived as a major threat by the inhabitants of the South 
of Lebanon, largely from Shi’ite sect, because of IDF repeated shelling and 
incursions in the South Lebanese borderland since early 1970s (Soueid, 2000). 
The context of the civil war in Lebanon and the subsequent militarization of all 
the sects (Bozarslan 2011, 90) can also explain the appeal a revolutionary 
movement based on a religion could have. At the beginning, Hizbullah was a 
small group of inexperienced fighters and clerics originally based in the Bekaa 
Valley – where they received training from Iranian guards of revolution. Taking 
part in joint operations with other militias against IDF in the South of Lebanon 
(Jabal Amel region), Hizbullah slowly spread its belief among people in the 
southern borderland through clerics and mollah’s preaches (da’wa). 
 
The movement appeared in public for the first time in February 1985 with an 
Open Letter published in an Arabic newspaper in Beirutiii. It stressed the 
necessity for the oppressed to unify under the banner of Islam through armed 
resistance (defined in religious term as jihâd) against the oppressors: Israel 
(which had to be erased) and western imperialist powers (which should be chased 
away). In this vision, borders are artificial and imposed by imperialism in order to 
divide the Umma, – the Muslim community. Under the label of “The Islamic 
Revolution in Lebanon” (Al-Thawra al-Islamiya fi Lubnan), Hizbullah sought to 
establish an Islamic state in Lebanon (following the Iranian model) and claimed 
to be follower of the Iranian religious authority of Khomeiny, a Shi’îte cleric who 
became a political leader of the Iranian revolution. In sum, this open letter 
resembles a political program under Islamic rule for an important social and 
political change in Lebanon thanks to a struggle against dominant powers 
(Alagha 2011).  
 
The Israeli withdrawal of June 1985 to a buffer zone along the borderline (that 
varied between 850 to 1100 sqkm) and the set up of the surrogate militia of the 
South Lebanese Army (SLA) – a professional corps of fighters stemming from 
the previous Christian militia under Israeli supervision – transformed the mode of 
resistance. Hizbullah shifted from operating constantly behind the lines to a front 
line warfare strategy with the fence of the SLA territory. This fence introduced an 
internal border in Lebanon’s national territory, a fragmentation of South Lebanon 
territory due to the military occupation of the borderland. 
 
This shift was accompanied with a process of military monopolization of 
southern key launch pads by Hizbullah to attack Israel in the occupied zone or 
beyond – eradicating other resistant groups by threats or by force. One strategic 
purpose of this move related to Syria’s control strategy over Lebanon since 1976. 
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That year, 30,000 Syrian troops entered Lebanon to mediate and monitor the 
Lebanese political and military scene to the point of taking control over the other 
Shi’ite milita, Amal (Lamloum 2010). In their speeches, Hizbullah’s leaders 
started to describe and define the South as “a battlefield”, “a confrontation area” 
and “a quagmire for the Israeli army”. This monopolization went along with 
adopting a more hegemonic name: the Islamic resistance in Lebanon (Al-
Mouqawama Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan). The goal of assuming that confrontational 
name intended to bring a symbolic type of profit as stated by Hassan Nasrallah 
(interviewed in 1986): “Our strategy is to build ourselves a future through 
confrontation with the Zionist enemy” (Noe 2007, 29). The link between the 
movement’s identity and the location of its military action in South Lebanon 
appears clearly in this statement. Depicting Israel as the supreme evil (sharr 
mutlaq) allowed the party to call for jihâd (holy war), justifying the armed 
resistance in a religious way. As Henk van Houtum & Ton van Naerssen (2002, 
134) remind, “making others through a territorial fixing of order, is intrinsically 
connected to our present image of borders. Others are both necessary, constitutive 
for the formation of borders (…). Others are needed and therefore constantly 
produced and reproduced to maintain the cohesion in the formatted order of a 
territorially demarcated society”. 
 
Any spatial strategy, according to Michel de Certeau (1980), requires a place that 
can be identified as one’s own to direct relations with an exteriority that can be 
competitors or enemies. If the Lebanese state became a competitor in the 1990s 
and 2000s in the welfare strategy towards the Shi’i population, in the 1980s rival 
militias had become enemies as the main goal was a territorial control of the 
southern borderland to monopolize the confrontation with IDF and so to 
(re)define the nature of the resistance. Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen 
(2002, 126) remind: “the making of a place must hence be understood as an act of 
purification, as it is arbitrarily searching for a justifiable, bounded cohesion of 
people and their activities in space”. In this perspective, taking advantage of the 
1985 first Israeli withdrawal (see map 1), Hizbullah tended to implant more 
deeply in this borderland area and enrol the population in the military struggle in 
each village through a re-organisation of tasks and division of work/territory 
(village guard units, liaison officers, informers, etc). It also spread its influence 
over Shi’i inhabitants of South Lebanon (the majority of the population there) 
whose values and cultural references fitted well with the religious-political 
message of Hizbullah. In so doing, it tended to erect a community, defining a 
group bound by common perceptions of a reality, culturally, religiously and 
politically. 
 
(insert map 1 here) 
 
 
I would like to analyse this process of group defining, ordering and bordering as 
the articulation of the formation of the ‘asabiyat (group of solidarity) and the 
diffusion of a da’wa (a religious/ideological call). Al-‘asabiyat describes a bond 
of cohesion in a community, a “patriotism” and “party-spirit” as translated in the 
first edition of the Encyclopedia of Islamiv. The French political scientist Jean 
Leca (1994) views ‘asabiyat as an “esprit de corps particulier” in a contemporary 
context to highlight the relationship of a group to a political power, either as an 
adjunct power for the State or as a dissident movementv. Al-da’wa originally 
means the call for religion, the invitation or propagandavi. In its extension in 
contemporary use, al-da’wa also involves the propaganda for any type of 
ideology, sacred or not (Bozarslan, 2011).   
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The formation of the ‘asabiyat of Hizbullah is primarily linked to the sectarian 
Shi’i belonging as its main bond is the religious da’wa, dominated by the key-
figure of Khomeiny as a supreme leader, diffusing its theory of wilayat al-faqih, 
(guidance of the jurisprudent) that merges politics and religion in the hand of one 
leader to spread the revolution and erect the Islamic state. Following this leader, 
Hizbullah’s vision is a revised version of the political shi’ism providing a new 
representation of Shi’i individuals as multazim (partisans socially, religiously and 
politically involved) and a new conception of its commitment to the guardianship 
of the jurisprudent (wilayat al-faqih). This involvement then implies a duty to 
resist for every Muslim (Qassem 2005) and it is precisely the adherence to these 
principles and values that creates the condition for a group of solidarity, the 
‘asabiyat, to emerge.  
 
These processes have been carefully analysed by Harb (2010) under the label of 
the hala islamiyya, a cognitive matrix that produces a collective consciousness 
and common beliefs incorporated by many Shi’a. This creates a sense of 
belonging, expressed everyday through norms, values, behaviours (Harb 2010, 
186-7) that are continually spread through resistance (jihad), martyrdom and 
commemorations. She explains how the notion of “Resistance” is working as a 
theoretical interface between the pious behaviour and the duty to bear arms to 
confront the enemy. More than the simple military action, says Harb (2010, 144), 
resistance should be understood as a personal path, a cause (qadiya), a mission of 
life, a methodology (manhajiyya) with a religious meaning. To adhere to the 
resistance cause is a personal choice and a religious duty (fard) that a Shi’i 
Muslim should do, as long as he acknowledges the guidance of the jurisprudent. 
This political interpretation Khomeiny made of the religious tradition can be 
identified as a da’wa: it works as a set of moral principles for life (Mervin 2008) 
and defines a collective solidarity restricted to a particular group, the Shi’as. The 
term used in Arabic to describe the type of bond that ties people, iltizam, 
describes a religious commitment at social and political levels that conveys ways 
of behaving (in dressing, talking, acting, etc.) and so creates a strong sense of 
collective belonging. 
 
2) Lebanonization of Hizbullah or South Lebanon as a 
sanctuary 
 
The death of Khomeiny in 1989 and the Ta’if Agreement, which put an end to the 
Lebanese civil war and led to the restoration of the Lebanese state, opened a 
process of necessary aggiornamento for Hizbullah’s profile. The Party of God 
had to fit in with the design of Lebanon’s second Republic so Syria and Iran 
supported internal change within Hizbullah with the aim of keeping it as their 
military asset towards Israel. In this perspective, an agreement was signed on 
November 9, 1990 between Iran and Syria regarding the two Shi’i militias 
(Syrian-backed Amal and Iran-backed Hizbullah) in the aftermath of the Ta’if 
Agreement. It basically stated that, in the post–civil war context of disarmament, 
if both militias became political parties, Amal would be entitled to manage state 
resources whereas Hizbullah would have the duty of continuing the armed 
struggle against Israel in order to liberate the Lebanese southern borderland 
(Lamloum 2009). The labelling of “Islamic Resistance in Lebanon” used to 
describe Hizbullah slowly simply became “The Resistance” undermining its 
Islamic dimension to fit the national scope of its mission. In other words, 
Hizbullah had to accept to change its revolutionary identity to continue to be the 
key resistant player in South Lebanon. The core identity of the party, as noted by 
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Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), thus resided precisely in its resistance duty that renders 
the Party of God dependent on direct access to its enemy, on the borderlandvii. 
 
Until this date, the party conceived the borders dividing the Islamic world as fake 
or colonial and advocated their eliminationviii. In recognizing the right for the 
Lebanese to resist against the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, the Ta’if 
Agreement eased the way for Hizbullah to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
Lebanon state borders. In the meantime, this recognition was a good deal, 
matching the sovereignty (of Lebanon) with sanctuary (of Hizbullah) thanks to 
the Syrian control over the political scene in Lebanon. This new official role as 
the national resistance helped the Party of God to build political capital – 
illustrated with several MPs entering the Parliament – seen as largely reliable 
thanks to its welfare capacity and massive support of the Shi’i population during 
and after the civil war when the state was absent (Catusse and Alagha 2008). This 
Hizbullah normalization of a former militia into a political force performing 
military resistance against an enemy state occupying the southern part of the 
country has been labelled as “lebanonization” (Alagha 2006).  
 
In order to set up its sanctuary, Hizbullah deployed a multi-layered strategy based 
on its welfare capacity that mainly targeted the southern suburb of Beirut as a 
way to support Shi’i migrants from the South (Rostami-Povey 2010), building a 
sense of collective belonging to a defined space with its specific authority, a mix 
of religious and social policies. The important investment in Beirut can be 
understood as the political step in its general strategy to spread resistance values 
playing on its image of a Shi’î movement able to build social welfare institutions 
to bring the Shi’as out of marginalisation. The military step was taken in South 
Lebanon borderland with daily operations against the occupied zone and the 
Israeli occupation. In order to achieve this strategy, Hizbullah institutionalized its 
position by gaining seats in the Lebanese parliament from 1992 onward through a 
parliamentary bloc called “Fidelity to the Resistance” (Hamzeh 1993). 
 
Following Rex Brynen (1990), who sketched his reflections on the Palestinian 
experience in Lebanon, a sanctuary can be define as a secure base where a group 
of insurgents is able to organise its political and military infrastructure required 
for its objectives. Borderlands play an important role as sanctuaries either 
externally as protected zones or internally as free zones. This led Brynen to 
define the host state of the sanctuary as a “sanctuary state” in contrast to the 
“disputed State” where guerrillas set up an internal sanctuary against the central 
power. Host states as sanctuaries could be either a political choice or something 
the state could not avoid. Several variables can influence a state in the choice of 
hosting a sanctuary, such as a high level of internal support the insurgents find in 
the state and even the enrolment of combatants or other assistance. In the 
meantime, insurgent operations provoke retaliation measures from the insurgents’ 
enemy and diplomatic reprisals. Brynen also underlines the political alliances that 
insurgents could have an interest in setting up to improve the host state’s support 
to their cause. And finally, the most important risk a State can face in hosting a 
sanctuary is when insurgents decide to overthrow state rulers in order to preserve 
the sanctuary and their own existence.  
 
In this light, South Lebanon can be identified as a sanctuary for Hizbullah. First, 
this movement had military control over this area since the onset of the Second 
Republic (1990) to the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South after the 
July War of 2006. This meant the freedom to organize its military apparatus and 
weaponry and to use its resistance mission as a political asset in recruiting 
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citizens of the South, whose pride was affected by the amputation of such an 
occupied area (850 sq/km – meaning a third of South Lebanon). The edification 
of the sanctuary went through a process of war of attrition inside and on the 
fringe of the occupied zone and through two main Israeli invasions (1993 and 
1996), the latter having the objective to lower Hizbullah’s popular support and to 
bring Syria and Lebanon to a diplomatic solution regarding South Lebanon 
(Hollis & Shehadi 1996). 
 
These confrontations that ended with “the Liberation of the South” as Hizbullah 
put it when IDF troops withdrew from Lebanon’s southern area, also helped the 
party of God to shape its identity by claiming the occupied borderland with its 
armed resistance, using the face of “the Zionist occupant”, describing its evil and 
absolute otherness, to depict the pure, legitimate and brave resistance identity. 
“Others are both necessary, constitutive for the formation of borders, as well as 
the implication of the process of forming these borders. Others are needed and 
therefore constantly produced and reproduced to maintain cohesion in the 
formatted order of the territorially demarcated society” (van Houtum and van 
Naerssen 2002, 134). On the day of the withdrawal, the Lebanese officers of the 
Israeli allies SLA were utterly surprised as they had not been informed. As some 
of them fled and sought refuge in Israel, the secretary general of Hizbullah, 
Hassan Nasrallah, talked about the cowardice of its enemy, its weakness and 
shameful behaviour in abandoning its Lebanese collaborators, “one thing that 
Hizbullah would never do”. By contrast, the morality of the Resistance appeared 
in a strong coherence with the religious principles of the Shi’i doctrine. 
 
The position of the State toward this sanctuary was ambivalent. As long as the 
Syrian political tutelage over Lebanon lasted, there were few questionings of the 
legitimacy of such a sanctuary. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, some 
political opponents raised the question of the continuation of the Resistance in 
describing the liberated South borderland as “Hizbullah land”. But major 
controversy appeared during the post-Syrian era, first in 2005, and 
symptomatically, at the end of the 2006 July War when Hizbullah approved the 
UNRSC 1701, which requested the Lebanese Army to come back in South 
Lebanon. Unable to continue its war of attrition towards Israel, Hizbullah stressed 
the need to focus its goal on the erection of a “State of Resistance”. This strategic 
choice had already been made during the 1990s, probably in a manner to preserve 
the sanctuary and within the strategic vision of an “Axis of Resistance” 
(International Crisis Group, 2010). The southern borderland area can therefore be 
understood as a sanctuary generating important symbolic and political resources 
for Hizbullah, as a step in to ruling the State. 
 
 
3) Recovering occupied territories, targeting the State 
 
The territorial strategy of human beings consists in classifying space, 
communicating a sense of place and enforcing control over a place (Sack 1986). 
This three-step program of action could be a guideline to observe and assess what 
Hizbullah did in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. As soon as 
Israel completed the first move of pulling out during the early morning of 22nd 
May that year, a popular protest of unarmed residents of southern villages at the 
northern limit of the occupied zone started to rise and put the pressure on SLA 
members (all Lebanese citizens) who fled their checkpoints as they understood 
IDF had just abandoned them. This pacific demonstration was mentioned during 
the public speech the Secretary General of the party gave in Beit Jbeil on 26 
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Mayix enhancing the “high level of civilization” of the Resistance whose 
members avoided any murders or acts of revenge against former Lebanese 
collaborators with Israel. 
 
In the territorial control strategy over the “liberated South”, Nasrallah 
symbolically gave his first speech from Bint Jbeil, the main city of the Jabal 
Amel area that was occupied. He defined it as “the capital of the Liberation” 
giving a new meaning to that town, a new centrality to the southerners and 
classifying it by opposition to the former occupied-capital town of the South, 
Merjayoun. He also talked about the resistance as “a positive force for Lebanon,” 
and reminded that resistance today must thank all the former martyrs of Amal, the 
Lebanese and Syrian armies, and the Palestinian fedayeen for having made the 
victory of 2000 possible. In his speech, Nasrallah blurred the boundaries among 
resistance fighters over time and political orientations in order to make Hizbullah 
appear as a synthesis of all these previous groups, as their heir apparent. He also 
defined South Lebanon as a region that had been a victim of Israel's behavior and 
that required order, respect, and unity among Christians and Muslims. From this 
perspective, he made statements lumping Hizbullah and the local population into 
one single group focusing on what needed to be done: “We, in this area, should 
prove that we deserve this victory (…) This area needs to be reinforced (morally) 
after the dark period it went through”. This task was then eased as the Lebanese 
government refused to deploy the national army in this part of the country under 
the pretext that Lebanon did not want to acknowledge the Israeli withdrawal as 
complete in taking position along the line of withdrawal (Picard 2000). The 
Lebanese government laid claim to several territories dismissed by the UN 
delineation commission that came to establish the full compliance of Israel with 
the UNRSC 425 (Meier 2013). Among them, one can find the Shebaa Farms 
territory that provided Hizbullah with the justification to continue its armed 
resistance. In these circumstances, the party of God was able to set up a local 
governance of the South of its own with full sovereignty over it, reminiscent of 
previous local governance systems during the civil war – for instance the civil 
administration of the Mountain by the Druzes (Harik 1993). This quasi-state 
capacity enjoyed by Hizbullah in the former occupied zone allowed the 
movement to define new social rules (e.g. compliance to the party, Islamic 
morality, refraining from vengeance). 
 
Another strategy linking Hizbullah with the area was to promote the local martyrs 
of the movement, natives from the Jabal Amel. The most well known mass 
communication the party set up on that point happened in 2006, after the end of 
the July War when every driver visiting the South was able to see huge signs on 
billboards along the motorway with just the number “1271” written on it. The 
message was even stronger as everybody knew this number represented the death 
toll of martyrs the country suffered during the July warx. More generally, 
martyrdom has been used since the beginning of the political appearance of the 
movement. Rooted in the religious culture of the Shi’a is the figure of the 
“shahid” (martyr) who is giving his life for God (Dizboni 2005). In the 20th 
century, martyrdom was transformed as a non-linear tactic to fight the enemies 
and has also been used by other sects and even by secular militants. In one of his 
speeches, Imam Khomeiny acknowledged the central role of the martyrs defined 
as “the engine, the soul of History” (Daguzan 2007). As part of their culture and 
religion, the Shi’a of Lebanon, under the influence of the Islamic republic of Iran 
and Hizbullah, found in the suicide combatant a figure of the hero (batal) as a 
martyr (shahid). The rationale that Hizbullah promotes tends to enhance the 
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honorable life that results from resistance, in opposition to the humiliating life 
that one lives when under occupation (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002). 
 
The diffusion and publicization of the figure of the martyr link the three 
processes highlighted by Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen (2002): firstly 
they allow the party to mark a local territory (bordering) with a clear political 
identity belonging (ordering); second, they value the involvement of ordinary 
social actors and pay respect to their extraordinary acts of duty (by othering the 
enemy) with a public display in honor of their memory. Valuing martyrdom gives 
Hizbullah internal profit, generating devotion to the Party and giving a model of 
behavior for local profit. In recent years, Hizbullah flags have been regularly 
installed showing the three “top” martyrs (al-shahid al-qaid), all rooted in the 
South, as they are natives from small villages in the borderland. Ragheb Harb, the 
first one, was a local sheikh that mobilized southerners against the Israeli 
occupation and was murdered by SLA militiamen in 1984. The second, Abbas 
Mussawi, was the former General Secretary of Hizbullah, killed by Israel with his 
family in his car on a road in the South in 1992. The third, Imad Moghnieh, was a 
top military officer of the party also killed by Israel when his car exploded as he 
switched on the ignition in 2008.  
 
Another powerful vector of the glorification of martyrs happened with the two 
main exchanges of prisoners/dead martyrs with Israel in 2004 and 2008. These 
huge events, well prepared and negotiated thanks to German intelligence services, 
took place as a result of Hizbullah’s tactic of abducting Israeli soldiers on the 
border. In treating them as bargaining chips, the party of God succeeded in 
freeing Lebanese prisoners in Israel and brought back to Lebanon the remains of 
martyrs (Palestinians as well as Lebanese). With such events, figures of martyrs 
were enhanced and even if most of the dead bodies belonged to former 
Palestinian leftist combatants killed during the 1970s and 1980s they were 
gathered under the flag of Hizbullah. Martyrs seem to have been used as a tool to 
unify a place’s history, all type of previous Resistance then being subsumed 
under the label of Hizbullah (Chaib, 2010). 
 
A transformation of the borderland space came with the July war in 2006 when 
Israel launched an attack to erase Hizbullah after it abducted two of its soldiers. 
At the end of the 33 days of war Hizbullah talked about a “divine victory”, a 
religious qualification working as cement sticking together the Shi’i constituency. 
The key leverage for the shift in space allocation in the South of Lebanon came 
thanks to UN Resolution 1701 that allowed the return of the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) after 28 years of absence. This resolution also strengthened of 
UNIFIL battalions up to 15,000 troops with a clear mandate to confiscate every 
weapon carried by non-authorised personnel, namely somebody who is not a LAF 
member. In consequence, Hizbullah had to redeploy its troops north of the Litani 
River with new hiding places for weaponry and training. 
 
Taking this change into account, Hassan Nasrallah underlined in his first speech 
of Bint Jbeil after the war (September 2006) the necessity for the party to turn to 
a new form of resistance, namely al-mumana’a. As Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (2007) 
clarifies, “the term mumana’a - derived from the Arabic word "to prevent" and 
which connotes all forms of non-military resistance, confrontation and rejection - 
refers to the politically confrontational stands assumed by Iran and Syria ». In this 
vision, the State is the new location, as was the South before, where to display at 
the national level its political program of resistance in order to build “the state of 
Resistance”. This move followed Hizbullah’s deeper involvement in national 
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politics with its participation in the first government after the Syrian withdrawal 
in 2005. The two processes ended up with the provoked fall of Hariri government 
in January 2011 followed by the installation of a pro-Syrian 8-March government 
under the lead of Najib Miqati, a moderate ally of Damascus. So, whereas the 
national dimension of the party had been reached through the Liberation of 2000, 
the July war in 2006 forced the Party to turn its power mainly inward – as the 
South is under international scrutiny – and affirm more clearly its political 
ambition and publicly express its national vision with a new Manifesto 
(December 2009). In this document, Hizbullah defines itself through a process of 
change: “From a force of liberation, the resistance has then reached a balance in 
its confrontation, and has now become a defensive and deterrent force in addition 
to its political role in Lebanon, which allows it to influence the construction of 
the state as an efficient and fair entity.” The borders on which this force deploys 
are clearly those of contemporary Lebanon, described as “our country” under the 
subheading “The nation.” This is a significant shift compared to the borderless 
Muslim nation (ummah) they claimed to be part of in the 1985 Open Letter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have tried to analyse, through Hizbullah’s words and actions, how 
its religious ideology and its political and military resistance work together, 
succeeding in the building of Shi’i ‘asabiyat. This process shows how the 
borderland area of South Lebanon was a resource for its political identity building 
thanks to the presence of an “enemy entity” and in the meantime affected the 
evolution of its identity, its political definition and the scope of its action. The 
movement’s emergence is clearly related to regional political and military 
contexts – the Iranian Islamic revolution and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon – 
influencing the process of politicization of the Lebanese Shi’a in a disputed 
borderland where an identified enemy (Israel) and a political cause (the 
Palestinian question) mobilized a local population under the lead of Shi’i clerics 
inspired by Imam Khomeiny’s doctrine. The three processes of 
bordering/ordering/othering of our theoretical framework appeared clearly linked 
to the space/identity question: the bordering process clearly refers to the 
definition of space, the locus at stake in South of Lebanon, the ordering process 
primarily deals with identity building, as the group needs values, symbols and a 
sense of belonging. Finally, as seen with martyrs, the othering process through 
the building of an enemy is a facet of the collective identity building that is 
related to a specific borderland territory. 
 
Hizbullah’s developmental process is related to local events – first Israeli 
withdrawal, local alliances with Syria and the end of the civil war – that deeply 
impacted its resistance mission, changing its identity to adapt to the new 
environment of the post-civil war era. If the military resistance improved its 
position within the country, the whole process of ‘asabiyat building shaped an 
environment of common values, references, norms among Hizbullah’s followers. 
The involvement (iltizam) started with a socialization process at school but also 
kindergarten, through sports camps, scouts (Le Thomas 2012), leisure parks 
(Harb and Deeb 2007), summer camps or trips as well as media programs, all 
dedicated to spreading religious values, the da’wa, and a social and political 
commitment to the Islamic sphere (hala islamiyya). The strength of this ‘asabiyat 
also rests on its clear boundaries, the moral order it rules: all alternative social 
practices are stigmatised as shameful (‘ayb) corrupted (mafsûdîn) or illegal 
(harâm).  
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In 2006, due to a massive deployment of armed forces (national army and 
UNIFIL) the southern borderland became a lost space for Hizbullah’s strategy as 
no military actions on the border could be launched anymore. It implied another 
adaptation for Hizbullah in transforming the notion of resistance, shifting from 
the military field to a political field at the national level. Slowly then, as part of a 
wider plan already formulated during the 1990s, Hizbullah started to become 
involved in state power in order to build a “state of Resistance”. In the meantime, 
South Lebanon remained as a resource, not least for constituency but also for 
raising the tension with Israel as several border issues remained, like the Shebaa 
Farms (Kaufman 2006). Among more recent developments, the involvement of 
the party of God alongside the Syrian regime overshadowed the military Israeli 
interventions in Syria. Such a move urged Nasrallah to warn that the Syrian 
border along the Golan Heights as well as South Lebanon could become a new 
hotspot for a military confrontationxi.  
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Map 1: Stages of Israeli Withdrawal in South Lebanon borderland 
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Endnotes 																																																								
* I would like to thanks the Swiss National Fund (SNF) for its support and Liam 
O’Dowd and CIBR at Queen’s University for their help and advice. I am also 
grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose comments helped me sharpen the 
arguments. i	See Franz Rosenthal translation in « Ibn Khaldûn », Encyclopedia.com 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Ibn_Khaldun.aspx#2-1G2:2830902289-full 	ii	The using of da’wa as a political call follows Bruno Etienne (1987) analysis of 
political islam.	
iii I rely hereafter on the English translation and comments of this document 
provided by Alagha (2011) 
iv Aṣabīya." Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition (1913-1936). Edited by M. Th. 
Houtsma, T.W. Arnold, R. Basset, R. Hartmann. Brill Online, 2013. Viewed 29 
July 2013 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
1/asabiya-SIM_0875> 
v One can also see the adaptation of ‘asabyiat done by Michel Seurat (1986) and 
Riccardo Bocco (1995) in contemporary contexts in the Machreq. 
vi "daʿwa." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Glossary and Index of 
Terms. Edited by: P.J. Bearman, Th. Banquis, C.E. Bowworth, E. van Donzel, W. 
P. Heinrichs Bowworth. Brill Online, 2013. Viewed 29 July 2013 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2-
Glossary-and-Index-of-Terms/dawa-SIM_gi_00796> 
vii Although Hizbullah General Secretary tended to minimize this disadvantage 
thanks to long ranging rockets able to reach major Israeli cities. See its martyr’s 
day speech (11 Nov 2009). 
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=9510&cid=450#.UgEW7x
YzUn4  
viii As mentioned in their Open Letter of February 1985 (Alagha, 2011). 
ix Available at : 
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=14178&cid=359#.UfzqxR
YzUn4  
x One of the web page of the website of Hizbullah is dedicated to southerners 
martyrs. See 
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=23193&cid=378#.Uf6osh
YzUn4  
xi See Al-Monitor, 10 May 2013. 		
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